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Abstract
Subjective Bayesianism is a major school of uncertain reasoning and statisti-
cal inference. It is often criticized for a lack of objectivity: (i) it opens the door
to the influence of values and biases, (ii) evidence judgments can vary substan-
tially between scientists, (iii) it is not suited for informing policy decisions. My
paper rebuts these concerns by bridging the debates on scientific objectivity and
statistical method. First, I show that the above concerns arise equally for stan-
dard frequentist inference. Second, I argue that the involved senses of objectivity
are epistemically inert. Third, I show that Subjective Bayesianism promotes other,
epistemically relevant senses of scientific objectivity—most notably by increasing
the transparency of scientific reasoning.
1 Introduction
How, and in what sense, can statistical inference be objective? In times of question-
able research practices, frequent replication failures, and dwindling trust in science,
this question is of the utmost importance for philosophy of statistics, and science in
general.
The present paper studies the objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism, a major school
of uncertain reasoning. It models an agent’s rational degrees of belief in a hypothesis
as following the laws of probability. The version of Subjective Bayesianism that I de-
fend in this paper is shared by many practitioners (e.g., Goodman, 1999; Howson and
∗Contact information: Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS), Tilburg
University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. Email: j.sprenger@uvt.nl. Webpage:
www.laeuferpaar.de
1
Urbach, 2006; Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013): empirical evidence informs (prior) de-
grees of belief, but it is usually not sufficient to determine them in a uniquely rational
way.
Subjective Bayesians revise their degrees of belief in a proposition (e.g., a scientific
hypothesis) by the principle of Bayesian Conditionalization. Assume, for example,
that you want to assess a hypothesis H and that p(H) describes your prior degree
of belief in H. You observe data D. Then, your posterior degree of belief in H after
learning D is equal to the conditional probability of H given D: p(H|D). This posterior
probability is given by Bayes’ Theorem:
p(H|D) = p(H)p(D|H)
p(D)
(1)
where p(D) = ∑Hi∈H p(D|Hi)p(Hi) is the marginal probability of data D relative to
the elements of the hypothesis space H.
After observing D, the posterior distribution p(·|D) serves as a basis for inference
and decision-making. For example, if H is the hypothesis that a new medical drug is
no better than a placebo, and if H is probable given D, then we will stop developing the
drug any further. In addition, the divergence between prior and posterior distribution
can be used for quantifying the degree to which D confirms H (Fitelson, 2001; Crupi,
2013).
There is a prima facie tension between Subjective Bayesianism and the pursuit of
scientific objectivity: the subjective elements in Bayesian reasoning, above all the choice
of a prior distribution, barely match widely endorsed senses of scientific objectivity,
such as intersubjectivity, value freedom, and conformity to standardized inference
protocols. Since the epistemic authority of science in guiding public policy leans on the
objectivity of scientific inference, it is sometimes claimed that “a notion of probability
as personalistic degree of belief [...], by its very nature, is not focused on the extraction
and presentation of evidence of a public and objective kind” (Cox and Mayo, 2010,
298). This view is echoed in writings of well-known statisticians, methodologists and
philosophers of science such as Fisher (1956), Mayo (1996), Popper (2002) and Senn
(2011).
These objections are prima facie plausible, but they are rarely buttressed by a con-
ceptual analysis of scientific objectivity. By transferring insights from the objectivity
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debate (e.g., Longino, 1990; Megill, 1994; Douglas, 2009) to the context of statistical
inference, I try to assess the probative value of the above objections, and the degree
to which Subjective Bayesianism can be objective. First, I present the criticisms of
Subjective Bayesianism in somewhat greater detail (Section 2) and I show that two
tempting responses are insufficient (Section 3). Then I argue that the criticisms ap-
ply equally to the main competitor of Subjective Bayesianism—frequentist inference
with significance tests (Section 4).1 What is more, the criticisms are based on outdated
(yet popular) and restrictive readings of scientific objectivity (Section 5) with dubious
epistemic value. Section 6 explains why Bayesian inference promotes relevant senses
of scientific objectivity (e.g., robustness, transparency, facilitating discussion and crit-
icism) that are not captured by traditional accounts. I support my argument with a
case study from social psychology. Section 7 wraps up the main insights. Thus, the
paper does not only defend the objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism: it also shows
how conceptual work on scientific objectivity bears on questions in the methodology
of statistical inference.
2 The Objections
Objectivity is a label that can be attached to different aspects of science: to the claims
of a theory in relation to the world, to the process of gathering data, to individual
reasoning about scientific theories, and to the social dimension of producing scientific
knowledge (Longino, 1990; Douglas, 2004, 2009; Reiss and Sprenger, 2014). These car-
riers correspond to diverse senses of scientific objectivity. I follow Heather Douglas’s
taxonomy which distinguishes eight senses of objectivity in science, and I adapt them
(where appropriate) to the context of statistical inference. Three senses pose obvious
challenges for Subjective Bayesianism:
Concordant Objectivity (Intersubjectivity) Different speakers or community mem-
bers agree on the reality of an observation, an evidence claim or a judgment on
a theory. This sense of objectivity is purely factual, not about the way agreement
is reached.
1A comparison of Subjective and Objective Bayesianism would also be of great interest, but be-
yond the scope of this already lengthy paper—especially because Objective Bayesianism is no monolithic
block, but contains different varieties and approaches (e.g. Jeffreys, 1961; Jaynes, 1968; Williamson, 2010;
Bernardo, 2012).
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Value-Free Objectivity Values and subjective judgments are banned from the pro-
cess of scientific reasoning (e.g., in assessing theories on the basis of observed
evidence). This sense of scientific objectivity sees values as detrimental to the
unbiasedness and impartiality of scientific research.
Procedural Objectivity Experimentation and reasoning processes are standardized
according to specific protocols. The point of this sense of objectivity is to elim-
inate individual idiosyncrasies and to obtain always the same result, regardless
of who performs an experiment or data analysis (see also Porter, 1996). It is
particularly influential in the life sciences, where strict standards regulate the
design, conduct and interpretation of medical trials.
Let us begin with concordant objectivity, or equivalently, intersubjectivity. This notion
has a long philosophical tradition, e.g., Quine (1992, 5) stated that “the requirement
of intersubjectivity is what makes science objective”. Subjective Bayesian inference vi-
olates concordant objectivity because different scientists typically use different priors
for analyzing one and the same dataset, leading to different conclusions. Since con-
sensus remains elusive, it is open which (and whose) probability assessments should
inform judgments on theories, and evidence-based public policy.
The failure of Subjective Bayesianism with respect to value-free objectivity may be
even more worrying. In sensitive areas such as climate science and the biomedical
sciences, financial and ethical stakes are high, and consequences of wrong decisions
are severe. These fields strive for inference methods that are as impartial and evidence-
based as possible, and the pronounced role of personal degrees of belief in Subjective
Bayesianism seems to jeopardize that aim. In the words of the medical methodologist
Lemuel Moyé:
Without specific safeguards, use of Bayesian procedures will set the stage
for the entry of non-fact-based information that, unable to make it through
the “evidence-based” front door, will sneak in through the back door of
“prior distributions”. There, it will wield its influence, perhaps wreaking
havoc on the research’s interpretation. (Moyé, 2008, 476)
The objection can be rephrased as saying that the choice of a prior, which cannot
always be based on hard information, will bias the final result in a particular direction.
4
It is clear that such a liberal procedure cannot be objective in the sense of being value-
free. Similarly, the discretion to choose a prior distribution at will is at odds with the
goal of attaining procedural objectivity by means of standardized, uniform statistical
analysis procedures.
All these tensions between Subjective Bayesianism and various senses of scientific
objectivity support Cox and Mayo’s intuition that (subjective) Bayesian methods fail
to quantify objective evidence for use in science and public policy. Indeed, one may
even conclude that Subjective Bayesians commit a category mistake. Their formalism
answers the question of what we may reasonably believe, but it does not quantify the
(objective) evidence for a scientific claim (Royall, 1997, 4).
The following sections respond to these worries. Before that, however, I would
like to explain why two popular defenses of Subjective Bayesianism fail to counter the
objections.
3 Convergence Theorems and Bayes Factors
A standard reply to the above worries contends that concordant objectivity may not
hold at the beginning of a research process, but it will be attained in the long run: “If a
fairly sharp consensus of views emerges from a rather wide spread of initial opinions,
then, and only then, might it be meaningful to refer to ‘objectivity’.” (Smith, 1986, 10).
And indeed, the famous merging-of-opinions or washing-out theorems (Blackwell and
Dubins, 1962; Gaifman and Snir, 1982) show that Bayesians eventually reach such a
consensus. The theorems study the limiting behavior of two agents’ degrees of belief
when they are informed by the same body of evidence. In a nutshell, the posterior
degrees of belief pN and qN will converge when collecting more and more information
(N → ∞), as long as their prior degrees of belief p and q assign probability zero to the
same propositions.2 This means that differences in prior probability will eventually
wash out.
Unfortunately, this observation fails to alleviate the worries from the previous sec-
tion. In practice, we deal with finite datasets to which the merging theorems do
not apply. They are purely asymptotic claims. Neither do they bound the speed of
2This means that p(X) = 0 ⇔ q(X) = 0; a property known as absolute continuity of probability
measures. Notably, the convergence is uniform, that it, it holds simultaneously for all elements of the
probability space.
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convergence, preventing an application to small to medium-sized datasets (see also
Earman, 1992, 148–149). The merging-of-opinion theorems do not state sufficient, but
only necessary conditions for a calculus of degree of belief that pursues the goal of
objectivity—just as statistical consistency (=convergence to the true value as sample
size increases) is a necessary, but not a sufficient property for the goodness of a sta-
tistical estimator. In particular, the merging theorems do not justify the claim that
Subjective Bayesianism achieves concordant objectivity.
Another reply proposes to shift the objectivity discourse from posterior distribu-
tions to Bayes factors. While posterior distributions are an important basis for action
and decision-making, they do not make any claims about the weight of a particular
body of evidence. But it is those claims that we want to be objective—especially be-
cause they allow non-experts to assess the statistical evidence and to make informed
policy decisions, without committing themselves to contentious prior assumptions.
Bayes factors (Kass and Raftery, 1995; Rouder et al., 2009) address this question by
describing how much data D favors hypothesis H1 over its competitor H0.
BF10(D) :=
p(H0|D)
p(H1|D) ·
p(H1)
p(H0)
=
p(D|H1)
p(D|H0) (2)
In other words, the Bayes factor measures the discriminative power of D with respect
to H1 and H0 by comparing the (average) probability of D under H1 to the (average)
probability of D under H0. The higher BF10(D) is, the more the data speak for H1, and
vice versa. Table 1 provides a standardized interpretation scheme for Bayes factors.
Notably, the Bayes factor is independent of how strongly one is convinced of H0
as opposed to H1 a priori because p(H0) and p(H1) cancel out when applying Bayes’
Theorem to p(H0|D) and p(H1|D). However, there is a crucial dependence on prior
probabilities. Assume that µ is a real-valued parameter and that we test the point
hypothesis H0 : µ = 0 against the alternative H1 : µ 6= 0. This is a very common
setting in science. In such a case, the Bayes factor will typically depend on how
spread out the prior distribution for H1 is: the extreme values of µ will badly fit the
observed data, driving down p(D|H1) =
∫
µ∈R p(D|µ) p(µ) dµ and thus, also BF10(D).
The phenomenon is reversed for priors that are concentrated around µ = 0. Hence,
individual differences in shaping the prior distribution influence—and possibly bias—
the final evidential claims. While I agree that Subjective Bayesians should use Bayes
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Bayes Factor BF10 Interpretation
>100 Extreme evidence for H1
30–100 Very strong evidence for H1
10–30 Strong evidence for H1
3–10 Moderate evidence for H1
1–3 Anecdotal evidence for H1
1 No evidence for either hypothesis
1/3–1 Anecdotal evidence for H0
1/3–1/10 Moderate evidence for H0
1/10–1/30 Strong evidence for H0
1/30–1/100 Very strong evidence for H0
<1/100 Extreme evidence for H0
Table 1: Classification of Bayes Factors according to Lee and Wagenmakers (2013),
adjusted from Jeffreys (1961).
factors for quantifying statistical evidence, this move alone is not enough to rebut the
objections concerning lack of value freedom, procedural uniformity and intersubjective
agreement.
4 Frequentism and Scientific Objectivity
In this section, I argue that the concerns about the objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism
apply equally to its main competitor: frequentist inference. In that school of statistics,
hypotheses are either true or false, and no objects of subjective uncertainty. Inferences
are justified on the basis of their long-run properties, not on the basis of posterior prob-
abilities. Among the many varieties of frequentist inference (Fisher, 1956; Neyman and
Pearson, 1967; Mayo, 1996), I focus on the most widespread one: Null Hypothesis Sig-
nificance Testing (NHST), and the use of p-values for quantifying statistical evidence.
(I will comment on extensions of NHST and alternative frequentist approaches at the
end of this section.) Notably, none of the arguments below depend on the frequent
misuse and misinterpretation of NHST in statistical practice, or on objections to the
logic of NHST. I focus on the classical problem of testing a point null hypothesis H0
against an unspecific alternative H1.
For the sake of simplicity, suppose that we analyze (approximately) Normally dis-
tributed data D = (X1, . . . , XN) with unknown mean µ—the parameter of interest—
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and unknown variance σ2.3 We calculate the sample mean X¯ and the (corrected)
standard deviation S by
X¯ =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
Xi S =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N
∑
i=1
(Xi − X¯)2
Now, the statistic
t =
X− µ0
S/
√
N
measures the divergence of the data from the null hypothesis H0 : µ = µ0. Under H0,
it follows Student’s t-distribution with N − 1 degrees of freedom. This allows us to
calculate the p-value: the probability that, if H0 were true, t would display an even
higher divergence from µ0 than the actually observed discrepancy.
p := pH0(|t(X)| ≥ |t|).
In this case, we conduct a two-tailed test and consider divergences in both directions
from µ = µ0. p < .05 is commonly interpreted as significant evidence against the null
hypothesis. Even smaller p-values denote strong (p < .01) and very strong (p < .001)
evidence against the null hypothesis. Standardly, researchers “reject the null” and
infer the alternative on the basis of such p-values.
On the face of it, p-values are way more objective measures of evidence than Bayes
factors: they do not involve subjective judgments or degrees of belief and they can be
calculated straightforwardly from the statistical model and the observed data. Each
researcher will obtain the same p-value when performing the same test. However,
these impressions are superficial and dissolve upon closer inspection.
First, NHST and p-values take an asymmetrical stance on the hypothesis testing
problem. There is no systematic guidance how we should interpret a non-significant
result (p ≥ .05). Statistics textbooks (e.g., Chase and Brown, 2000; Wasserman, 2004)
restrict themselves to a purely negative interpretation: p ≥ .05 means failure to demon-
strate a statistically significant phenomenon. The founding father of NHST, R.A. Fisher
(1935) even stressed that the only purpose of an experiment is to disprove the null hy-
pothesis, and that we cannot say whether the results confirm the null hypothesis.
3Data are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
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Obviously, this leads to problems whenever the null hypothesis is of substantial sci-
entific interest, e.g., independence of two variables in a causal model, the safety of a
medical drug, or absence of parapsychological forces (Gallistel, 2009; Wetzels et al.,
2009; Morey et al., 2014; Sprenger, 2017).
In other words, phrasing a scientific inference problem in terms of NHST intro-
duces a value judgment by ruling out the possibility of evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis. Especially when the topic under investigation is delicate and politically
contentious (e.g., the null hypothesis claims that a particular factor does not contribute
to global warming), the asymmetry of NHST undermines their value-freedom: there
is no way how we could ever quantify the evidence for that claim and inform policy-
makers accordingly. NHST is tied to a purist falsificationist methodology which fails
to be adequate when similarly important hypotheses are pitched against each other.4
Second, frequentist inferences are justified by the long-run properties of the proce-
dures that generate them. This makes good experimental design vital for the justifi-
cation of the entire inference. In particular, experiments are considered to be reliable
when the type I error—the probability of observing significant evidence against a true
null hypothesis—is bounded at a low level (e.g., α = .05), and the power of the ex-
periment to appraise a true alternative is reasonably high (e.g., 1− β = .8). Power is
always relative to a particular, representative effect size. It needs to be decided before-
hand which effect sizes are plausible alternatives to the null such that one does not
end up with an underpowered experiment and an unreliable inference (Cohen, 1988;
Ioannidis, 2005). There is no surrogate for sound individual scientific judgment in this
task. Subjective plausibility judgments are not only essential to Bayesian inference:
they are part and parcel of NHST, and in fact, any method of scientific inference (for a
practitioner’s perspective, see Gelman and Hennig, 2017).
Third, p-values are computed relative to a statistical test, the direction of which is
a matter of subjective judgment. In a recent experiment, the well-known social psy-
chologist Daryl J. Bem (2011) published a study which presented evidence for various
precognitive skills (“extrasensory powers”, “psi”), including retroactive influence of
a future event on an individual’s behavior. In a Bernoulli (success/failure) experi-
4Sometimes, meta-analysis is supposed to fill this gap, e.g., failure to find significant evidence against
the null in a series of experiments counts as evidence for the null. But first, this move does not provide a
systematic, principled theory of statistical evidence, and second, it fails to answer the important question
how data support the null hypothesis in a single experiment.
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ment, Bem tested the null hypothesis H0 : µ = .5 that success and failure are equally
likely against the (one-sided) alternative H1 : µ > .5 that precognition would lead to
higher success than failure rates. In most experiments, the null was rejected at the
α = .05 level (p < .05). However, this finding was sensitive to whether the test was
conducted as a two-sided test (H1 : µ 6= .5) or as a one-sided test where only depar-
tures in a specific direction are considered (H1 : µ > .5). The authors who critically
discussed Bem’s findings (Rouder and Morey, 2011; Wagenmakers et al., 2011a) in-
sisted that a more stringent two-tailed test be performed, where deviations in both
directions would count as evidence against the null. Ultimately, the evaluation of the
statistical evidence depends on how plausible it is that only positive departures from
chance need to be considered as a serious alternative to the null hypothesis. This case
shows that p-values are not as intersubjectively agreed, mechanically reproducible and
value-free as a look at statistics textbooks may suggest.5
Fourth and last, supporting scientific judgments on the basis of p-values is not
straightforward. Critics of Bem’s experiment insist that given the extraordinary na-
ture of Bem’s theoretical claims, p-values against the null of no precognition have
to be much more convincing than the conventional p < .05 (Wagenmakers et al.,
2011a). Indeed, what counts as substantial evidence against the null seems to be
highly context-sensitive. While the psychological community usually conforms to the
p < .05 criterion, standards are much more demanding in discplines such as particle
physics where a divergence of five standard deviations (p ≈ O(10−6)) would be re-
quired before considered evidence for a major finding, such as the recent discovery of
the Higgs Boson. It may be argued that this is just a contingent sociological problem,
but if so, it is highly persistent!
The more general issue hiding here is the well-known problem of inductive risk in
the assessment of scientific theories. Since the works of Rudner (1953) and Hempel
(1965) it is known that weighing uncertainties in statistical reasoning involves value
judgments—be it by the individual scientist or the scientific community in a field (Levi,
1960; Douglas, 2000). Both Bayesians and frequentists face this problem: translating p-
values into a scientifically meaningful conclusion requires no less subjective judgment
5Of course, the problem is more general: for both Bayesians and frequentists, the choice of a statistical
test demands a lot of subjective judgment. Often, these choices are nontrivial even in simple problems,
e.g., in deciding whether to analyze a contingency table with Fisher’s exact test, Pearson’s χ2-test or yet
another method.
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and consideration of context than for Bayes factors.
We have named four factors that impair the objectivity of frequentist inference with
NHST: (1) the asymmetrical design of NHST and the impossibility to confirm the null
hypothesis, (2) the need for plausibility judgments in power analysis and experimental
design, (3+4) the contentious calculation and interpretation of p-values, including the
general problem of inductive risk. All three senses of objectivity from Section 5—
value-free, procedural and concordant objectivity—are affected by these factors.
It could be argued that my arguments make a good case against the classical NHST
method, but fail to hold for more sophisticated forms of frequentism. For instance, Co-
hen’s (1988) power-centered perspective constructs frequentist inference as a decision
procedure where it is also possible to (pragmatically) accept the null hypothesis when
it fits the data better than the alternative hypothesis of a scientifically meaningful ef-
fect. But this is essentially a decision procedure for statistical inference and gives up
on attempts to quantify evidence for the null—which is even conceded by proponents
of that paradigm (Machery, 2012, 816–818). The same holds true for the estimation-
centered paradigm that proposes to replace NHST by estimation with confidence in-
tervals (Cumming, 2014). Since confidence intervals have a valid pre-experimental,
but no valid post-experimental interpretation, the estimation paradigm does not an-
swer the important question of how to quantify statistical evidence for and against the
tested null hypothesis (see also Gallistel, 2009; Morey et al., 2014)—whatever its other
merits may be.
All in all, Subjective Bayesianism and (NHST) frequentism face similar problems
when they are evaluated in terms of concordant, value-free and procedural objectiv-
ity. Now I will argue that these criteria are epistemically inert and a poor basis for
assessing the objectivity of statistical inference procedures in the first place.
5 Beyond Concordant, Value-Free, and Procedural Objectivity
In this section, I question the epistemic value of concordant, value-free, and procedural
objectivity, motivating that we have to consider other senses of objectivity, too.
First, the pursuit of procedural objectivity by means of banning subjective judg-
ment and promoting standardized protocols has often contributed to a mindless use
of statistical techniques (Cohen, 1994; Gigerenzer, 2004; Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008):
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significance levels expressed by p-values replace proper scientific thinking and lead to
the suppression of scientifically valuable, but statistically insignificant research (e.g.,
Rosenthal, 1979; Ioannidis, 2005). Here is a particularly illuminating quote:
All psychologists know that statistically significant does not mean plain-
English significant, but if one reads the literature, one often discovers that
a finding reported in the Results sections studded with asterisks becomes
in the Discussion section highly significant or very highly significant, im-
portant, big! (Cohen, 1994, 1001)
In other words, procedural objectivity may have its merits in highly policitized or bias-
prone areas of research, but at the same time, it tends to promote mechanical, mindless
and possibly misleading use of statistical inference procedures. It is therefore highly
context-dependent whether procedural objectivity is epistemically beneficial.
This diagnosis has implications for concordant objectivity, too. This sense of ob-
jectivity as intersubjectivity is purely factual; it does not make claims to intrinsic epis-
temic value. After all, scientists often differ in their disciplinary training, experience,
or methodological approach, and these differences will justifiably lead them to differ-
ent assumptions (e.g., prior distributions), and different conclusions. Meta-analysis
and evidence aggregation is a more promising place for concordant objectivity: under
ideal circumstances, a free exchange of information and argument may lead to individ-
ually rational belief states and intersubjective agreement at the same time (e.g., Lehrer
and Wagner, 1981). If we want concordant objectivity to be epistemically valuable, it
must not be seen as a constraint on data analysis, but act at the level of amalgamating
research findings.
Finally, there is value-free objectivity. We have already mentioned the problem of
inductive risk. By now, it is commonly accepted that complete value freedom cannot
be achieved in scientific reasoning, and statistical reasoning in particular (e.g., Rudner,
1953; Douglas, 2000). As a consequence, Douglas (2004, 2009) proposes to replace
value-free objectivity by detached objectivity: values may have a place in scientific
reasoning as long as they do not replace the evidence. This proposal implements the
idea that objectivity implies impartiality in a more modest way than complete value
freedom, and it explains why we prioritize evidence over values in forming a judgment
on scientific hypotheses. With respect to detached objectivity, however, the criticism
of Subjective Bayesianism loses much of its sting: the shape of the prior distribution
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affects the outcomes of a Bayesian analysis, but it is less clear why this is problematic.
As long as the prior distribution can be justified by reference to past experience or
theoretical considerations, the particular choice of the data analyst does not replace
evidence by values and violate the ideal of detached objectivity.
Similarly, Subjective Bayesianism fits the bill with respect to Douglas’ value-neutral
objectivity, which means “taking a position that is balanced or neutral with respect
to a spectrum of values” and avoiding positions that “are more extreme than they are
supportable” (Douglas, 2004, 460). For sure, prior probabilities can express extreme
positions, but criticizing and varying them is a routine part of Bayesian inference (more
on this will be said in Section 6). If value-neutral objectivity fails in practice, it is not
because Subjective Bayesianism is methodologically flawed, but because its methods
are abused—just as NHST and p-values are often abused, too.
Of course, this brief overview cannot replace a thorough discussion of scientific
objectivity (e.g., McMullin, 1982; Megill, 1994; Longino, 1990; Lacey, 1999; Douglas,
2009; Reiss and Sprenger, 2014). Here, I only wanted to motivate why value freedom,
concordance and procedural standardization may be epistemically inert senses of ob-
jectivity: they do not contribute to the reliability and epistemic authority of scientific
research, or at least not as much as it may appear at first sight. Other conceptions,
such as detached and value-neutral objectivity, appear more reasonable, but then it is
less clear why Subjective Bayesianism struggles to meet these ideals.
I will now introduce two other senses of scientific objectivity and show that on
these counts, subjective Bayesian inference outperforms the rivalling frequentist frame-
work. A case study—Bem’s experiment on extrasensory powers—shall buttress my
claims.
6 Interactive and Convergent Objectivity
This section moves our discussion of scientific objectivity from the level of individ-
ual reasoning to the social aspects of knowledge production. A prominent sense of
objectivity in that domain is Helen Longino’s
Interactive Objectivity “A method of inquiry is objective to the degree that it permits
transformative criticism” (Longino, 1990, 76). This includes, among others, the
existence of (1) avenues for criticism of the obtained results; (2) shared standards
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for assessing theories; and (3) equality of intellectual authority among qualified
practitioners (see also Harding, 1991; Douglas, 2004).
In the first place, the concept of interactive objectivity aims at the social structures that
regulate and facilitate scientific communication. That is, science must be structured in
such a way that arguments can flow freely, that constructive criticism is possible, and
that discussions are not stifled by the power and authority of a particular subgroup in
the scientific community.
Interactive objectivity can be applied at the level of statistical inference, too. Sub-
jective Bayesianism promotes interactive objectivity because it makes crucial assump-
tions behind a statistical inference transparent, such as structural assumptions on the
unknown parameter, or expectations on the observed effect size. This move opens
exactly those avenues for mutual criticism that are demanded from objective science
(cf. Gelman and Hennig, 2017). In frequentist inference, however, such assumptions
are often hidden behind the curtain (see Section 4).
The debate about the Bem (2011) study on precognition, mentioned in Section
4, illustrates these abstract considerations. Bem conducted a series of nine similar
experiments that tested the null hypothesis of no precognition. In one experiment,
participants were asked which of two pictures on a computer screen they liked better.
Later, the computer would randomly select one of the pictures as the “target” that
would be displayed subliminally during the rest of the experiment. More often than
chance would allow for, participants preferred the target which would later be selected
by the computer. Also the other experiments tested for the existence of retroactive
influence patterns with binary response variables (success/failure).
Bem’s study stirred a great deal of controversy. There were doubts about the
interpretability of some of Bem’s experiments (e.g., Rouder and Morey, 2011), and
indications for questionable research practices, such as selective reporting and sell-
ing exploratory as confirmatory research (Wagenmakers et al., 2011a; Francis, 2012).
Moreover, subsequent experiments failed to replicate Bem’s effects (Galak et al., 2012).
For the sake of the argument, we will not belabor these points, assume that the ex-
periments have been conducted and reported in an orderly fashion and focus on the
statistical analysis of the data. Bem pitched the null hypothesis H0 : µ = .5 (=no pre-
cognition, participants are guessing) against the alternative H1 : µ > .5 (=participants
do systematically better than guessing). Using a one-sided t-test as a large sample ap-
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proximation of testing the mean of a Binomial distribution, Bem observed statistically
significant evidence against the null hypothesis (p < .05) in eight out of nine experi-
ments. The mean effect size over all experiments was δ = 0.22, a small to moderate
value. Overall, the results were supposed to indicate strong evidence against the null
hypothesis of no precognition.
Wagenmakers et al. (2011a,b) conducted a Bayesian re-analysis of Bem’s original
data. In their critique of Bem’s original data analysis, Wagenmakers et al. used a
hierarchical Bayesian model where uncertainty about the true effect size δ is described
by a Normal distribution N(µ, σ2), centered around zero (µ = 0) and with unknown
variance σ2δ ∼ 1/χ2(1). When integrating out the influence of the variance σ2, the
prior for the effect size δ follows a Cauchy distribution with probability density fr
given below. The slope of the distribution is described by a scale parameter r (Rouder
et al., 2009).
fr(δ) =
1
pir
· r
2
r2 + δ2
Using the default choice r = 1, whose theoretical motivation goes back to Harold Jef-
freys (1961), Wagenmakers and colleagues obtained a specific prior distribution for δ:
f1(δ) = 1/(pi · (1+ δ2)).6 With that distribution, they performed a two-tailed Bayesian
t-test and concluded that a majority of experiments report evidence in favor of the
null hypothesis. Only one experiment provides moderate evidence for the alternative
hypothesis H1 (10 > BF10 > 3—see Table 1 and 2), four further experiments report
anecdotal evidence in favor of H0 (3 > BF10 > 1) or no evidence at all (BF10 ≈ 1). The
other experiments support H0 to various degrees, leading to the overall conclusion
that the evidence did not favor H1.
In their response to the paper by Wagenmakers and colleagues, Bem et al. (2011)
argued that this Bayesian analysis was based on prior distributions which are not
suitable for analyzing data in parapsychological research. They noted that effect sizes
in psychology are typically small to moderate (δ ≈ 0.25, Bornstein, 1989; Richard et al.,
2003), and even smaller for parapsychological effects. This does not square well with
the assumptions of Wagenmakers et al. that under H1, we believe with probability
.43 that the absolute value of the effect will be greater than .8. If we could rationally
6The use of default priors in Bayesian inference raises a number of interesting philosophical questions
(e.g., Sprenger, 2012) which go beyond the scope of this paper. That said, for the given (Binomial) dataset,
the chosen approach looks adequate.
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Experiment No. 1 2 3 4 5 6(a+b) 7 8 9
BF10, Wagenmakers et al. 1.64 1.05 1.82 0.58 0.88 1.10 0.13 0.47 5.88
BF10, Bem, Utts and Johnson 4.94 3.45 5.35 1.76 2.74 3.78 0.50 1.62 1012
Table 2: The Bayes factor BF10 for the alternative hypothesis H1 : µ 6= .5 vs. the
null hypothesis H0 : µ = .5 in a two-tailed test, according to the Cauchy prior of
Wagenmakers et al. (2011a) and the knowledge-based prior of Bem et al. (2011).
expect to observe such large effect sizes, there would be no debate about the reality of
parapsychological phenomena.
The same argument is applied to argue against the use of Cauchy priors with their
relatively thick, diffuse tails (see Figure 1). Placing any substantial probability on re-
ally large effects seems to be plainly inconsistent with the inconclusive and disputed
evidence from parapsychological experiments (Hyman and Honorton, 1986; Utts, 1991;
Storm et al., 2010). Yet, the prior distribution which is chosen by Wagenmakers and
colleagues place a 6% chance on effects greater than 10. Also this is clearly an unre-
alistic assumption. Choosing wide priors tends to favor the null hypothesis since the
alternative hypothesis contains lots of extreme hypotheses which have, under spread-
out priors, a substantial weight in the calculation of the Bayes factor.
Instead, Bem et al. (2011, 717–718) advocate a “knowledge-based prior” on δ which
differs in two crucial respects: (1) it is based on a Normal instead of a Cauchy distri-
bution, leading to flat tails and highly improbable observations of large effects; (2) the
variance σ2 is chosen such that one’s degree of belief in δ ∈ [−0.5, 0.5] is equal to 90%,
provided there is an effect at all. Figure 1 plots this prior distribution against the prior
used by Wagenmakers and colleagues. Using their “knowledge-based prior”, Bem,
Utts and Johnson obtain moderate evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis in
most experiments. Multiplying the Bayes factors from the individual experiments,
they argue that the total picture provides overwhelming evidence against the null
hypothesis.
Unsurprisingly, Wagenmakers and colleagues fail to be convinced. They object to
the multiplication of Bayes factors across experiments. Moreover, they dispute the as-
sumption that effect sizes should be that small, citing a survey of published articles in
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review and Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory
and Cognition (Wetzels and Wagenmakers, 2012). These data suggest that substantial
effects are as likely as small effects.
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Figure 1: The default Cauchy prior (r = 1) advocated by Rouder et al. (2009) and
used by Wagenmakers et al. (2011a) versus the “knowledge-based prior” based on the
Normal distribution by Bem et al. (2011).
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The point of reporting this debate is not to argue that either party is right or wrong.
Rather, I would like to illuminate how the subjective Bayesian framework enhances
transparency in statistical reasoning, and how it facilitates reasoning and argumenta-
tion about the assumptions involved. Phrasing their assumptions in terms of a prior
distribution enables two parties to trace the roots of their disagreement in a principled
way, to identify the scientific propositions on which they disagree, and to correct po-
tential errors. In the Bem case, the disagreement is primarily fed by three factors: (1)
the technical question whether Bayes factors can be multiplied across experiments; (2)
the mixed evidence about the distribution of effect sizes in psychology; (3) the method-
ological question whether the specific nature of parapsychological experiments should
be taken into account when shaping the alternative hypothesis.
It is not easy to imagine a similarly productive discourse in frequentist statistics,
where a mechanistic interpretation of p-values prevails, and no (probabilistic) judg-
ments about the plausibility of specific effect sizes are allowed. Subjective Bayesian
inference does a much better job at enabling readers, stakeholders policy makers to
form their own opinion about the implications of an experiment: by making prior dis-
tributions transparent, they can decide to what extent they agree with the conclusions.
Both sides in the debate agree, incidentally, that this transparency is a great advan-
tage of Bayesian statistics, both epistemically and socially, and they also confirm that
subjective assumptions are inevitable in scientific modeling (Bem et al. (2011, 718–719)
and Wagenmakers et al. (2011b, 11–12)).
I would also like to point out a particular technique used by Wagenmakers and
colleagues: robustness analysis, that is, assessing the sensitivity of the conclusions with
respect to the prior assumptions. Since any Bayesian inference relies on a prior prob-
ability distribution, subjective Bayesians usually try to secure their evidential claims
by showing that it is invariant under a variety of prior distributions. This technique is
supposed to dispel worries that the final result is the product of idiosyncratic or ex-
treme assumptions. Regulatory bodies even regard robustness analysis as an essential
part of Bayesian reasoning:
We recommend you be prepared to clinically and statistically justify your
choices of prior information. In addition, we recommend that you per-
form sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of your models to different
choices of prior distributions. (US Food and Drug Administration, 2010)
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Figure 2: The robustness analysis of Wagenmakers et al. (2011a) regarding the Bayes
factors for the null hypothesis in Bem’s (2011) experiments. Experiment 6 was split
into two datasets.
Checking the robustness of a Bayesian inference with respect to the priors is built into
the epistemic framework of Subjective Bayesianism, up to the point that it is a stan-
dard option in Bayesian statistics packages (e.g., JASP). Given the contentious nature of
expectations about effect sizes in parapsychology, Wagenmakers and colleagues con-
ducted a robustness analysis that varied the value of the scale parameter r. The results
are taken from the online appendix of Wagenmakers et al. (2011a) and reproduced in
Figure 2.
From these figures it becomes clear that only for a single experiment—Experiment
#9, reproduced in the bottom right corner—, there is stable evidence in favor of H1.
By contrast, most experiments show that there is stable evidence in favor of H0, in-
dependent of the choice of r. Only for very specific choices of r, the overall picture
favors H1. Also, they point out that the choice of the scale parameter in Bem et al.’s
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knowledge-based prior clearly favors the alternative: almost all other values of that
parameter would, within the Gaussian model chosen by Bem et al. (2011), lead to a
more favorable assessment of the null hypothesis. These analyses suggest that the
evidence claim in favor of H0 is more robust, and therefore more stable, than Bem’s
claim in favor of H1.
Robustness analysis contributes to the assessment of the resilience of an evidential
claim, and it is a good check against violations of value-neutral objectivity (Section 5).
Evidence claims that require very specific, and possibly extreme prior assumptions,
such as in the case of Bem (2011) and Bem et al. (2011), hardly qualify for the “balanced
judgment” that distinguishes value-free objectivity. That said, robustness analysis also
matches another important sense of scientific objectivity (Douglas, 2004, 2009):
Convergent Objectivity A scientific result is objective to the extent that it is validated
from independent assumptions and perspectives. Stability of a result under those
variations increases confidence in its reliability.
Originally, this definition was meant to apply in a wide sense, e.g., to invariance of a
phenomenon or inference under different experimental designs and theoretical mod-
els. For example, Scheele, Priestley and Lavoisier independently conducted ground-
breaking work that led to the recognition of oxygen as a chemical element, and the
rejection of the phlogiston theory. But there is no reason why this concept should not
encompass sensitivity analysis with respect to Bayesian priors, too, and we have seen
how robustness considerations in Subjective Bayesianism, and their entrenchment in
regulatory constraints, foster the pursuit of convergent objectivity.
Of course, robustness analysis in statistics is more general than this particular ap-
plication (e.g., Huber, 2009; Staley, 2012), but frequentist theory mostly deals with
distributional robustness: deviations from the assumed sampling distribution, such as
violations of Normality or homoscedasticity. It does not involve robustness with re-
spect to expectations on the size of the observed effect (though see Mayo and Spanos,
2006).
All in all, Subjective Bayesianism promotes objectivity in various ways, especially
in the social dimension of scientific inquiry. By adopting the ideal of robustness to
variations in the priors, subjective Bayesian inference secures the stability of evidential
claims and contributes to convergent as well as value-neutral objectivity. By means of
transparent prior distributions, it opens up avenues for criticism by scientific peers and
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contributes to interactive objectivity. Arguments for or against specific priors have to
be justified by theoretical considerations or past data, not by authority or fiat. Choices
are only as good and reasonable as the arguments that support them. These aspects
of Subjective Bayesianism facilitate the “transformative criticism” (Longino, 1990, 76)
that distinguishes interactive objectivity in the production of scientific knowledge.
7 Conclusions
This paper has argued that charging subjective Bayesianism with lack of objectivity is
based on a misunderstanding. The counterargument was based on a threefold strategy.
First, I have shown that frequentist (NHST) inference suffers from the very same prob-
lems as Subjective Bayesianism, albeit in a more hidden way (Section 4). Second, the
senses of objectivity that suggest a critical judgment on Subjective Bayesianism (con-
cordance, value freedom, procedural uniformity) have dubious epistemic value. Real-
izing this point makes us less confident that subjective Bayesian inference undermines
the epistemic authority of science (Section 5). Finally, Subjective Bayesianism promotes
two epistemically and socially relevant senses of scientific objectivity, namely interac-
tive and convergent objectivity (Section 6). Subjective Bayesianism makes robustness
analysis an integral part of assessing evidential claims, it increases the transparency of
statistical reasoning, and it facilitates a critical discussion of crucial modeling assump-
tions, such as the shape of the prior distribution.
Obviously, the investigations in this paper should be extended to other schools of
statistical inference, such as Objective Bayesianism, and other varieties of frequentist
inference. For the time being, the present research supports the conclusion that Sub-
jective Bayesianism is surprisingly objective (in the senses specified above), and that it
compares favorably to standard frequentist inference.
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